In honor again of PIPA/SOPA we offer you these three Classified Cables released through Wikileaks dating back as far to 2007. The important points of reference have been highlighted. In the midst of the anti-Iran propaganda currently being relayed through the US media, we feel it would be beneficial for our readers to see what has been spoken about Iran (even their Prez in his own words) in what were once, sealed documents. Thanks to open sharing and the brazen balls of a few, we still have these documents to refer to. The link in the titles will take you to the original Wikileaks document. We leave you to draw your own conclusions, though we venture to say Cable 3 appears to go against the grain of what is being reported through US media.
Emphasis is added by CC
CABLE 1 - May 5, 2007
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2017
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF TALKS WITH THE US (C-NE7-00968)
RPO DUBAI 00000036 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1.(C) Summary: While we have not heard anything outside of
press reporting regarding Iran's goals and strategies for the
upcoming May 28 meeting with the US on Iraq, we have had some
discussions with contacts regarding interlocutors and some
positive and negative reactions to the idea of talks. The
choice of interlocutor will be a good indicator of who is in the
driver's seat of policy right now. The arrest of academic Haleh
Esfandiari may be an effort by some to torpedo talks, although
there is no sign yet from the Iranian side that they are
distancing themselves from attending. Iranian officials seem to
be making major efforts to publicly justify Iran's
participation, despite other signs of crackdowns on links to the
US. Iran may also see Esfandiari as a bargaining chip against
the Irbil 5. End summary
2.A.(S) WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HAVE IRANIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSSED
THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER OR NEGOTIATE ON DURING BILATERAL
TALKS WITH THE US? WHAT WILL THEY BRING TO THE TABLE? WHAT
ISSUES WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED OR ARE RED LINES? WHAT ISSUES WILL
THEY BROACH WITHOUT HESITATION? WHAT ARE THE PLANNED TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION FOR THOSE MEETINGS?
-- (U) Iranian official statements have almost uniformly
asserted that the only topic for discussion with the US is Iraq,
and the only reason Iran is meeting with the US is at the behest
of the Iraqi government. The Supreme Leader said May 16 that
the talks would be used to "remind Washington of its failed
duties in the conflict torn country." He reiterated that Iran's
policy toward the US has not changed, asking "how can one have a
dialogue with an arrogant, bullying, expansionist an imperial
American government, especially with its current, brazen,
ill-mannered and boastful statesmen?" In his weekly press
conference May 20, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hosseini said that
Iran is not linking the nuclear issue to US-Iran talks in Iraq.
Official statements continue to assert that Iran will not
consider discussing other topics than Iraq with the US until the
US "changes its aggressive behavior" and makes "a gesture of
goodwill." It also continues to refuse to meet the precondition
of suspension of enrichment necessary for talks with the P5-1.
-- (S/NF) Privately, several Iranian contacts have opined that
these public statements are meant to appease hardliners who
repeatedly point out that ideologically, nothing has changed
between the two countries in the last 28 years. None of our
sources have claimed any insider knowledge of what Iran is
likely to raise in the May 28 talks, other than the obvious
issue of the detained Irbil 5. An influential source close to
Rafsanjani reportedly told a contact that he believed that the
release of the five was a prerequisite to US-Iran talks on Iraq
at the ministerial level.
¶B. (S) WHAT TYPES OF DEBATE, IF ANY, ARE OCCURRING IN THE ELITE
RANKS, THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, THE EXPEDIENCY
COUNCIL, OR THE CABINET ABOUT THE TALKS? WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS
AGAINST THEM? AND WHY?
-- (S/NF) Prior to the Sharm el-Sheikh talks, the same source
close to Rafsanjani told IRPO Director that contact between US
and Iranian foreign ministers would break a longstanding taboo
and make other kinds of US-Iran contact easier. Given that
there was a degree of exchange in Egypt, albeit not substantive,
it would appear that such contact had been sanctioned at the
highest level. However, the prediction that the taboo would be
broken has not borne out, as evidenced by the arrest May 8 and
subsequent charges against Iranian-American academic Haleh
Esfandiari for working against the Iranian government. Her
arrest, as well as other problems facing Iranian-Americans,
seems designed as a message to scare Iranians off from contact
with the US. At the same time, it reflects increased paranoia
over US intentions toward the regime. However, it cannot be
discounted that the Iranian government may try to see Esfandiari
mostly as a bartering chip for the Irbil 5, a view echoed by
several contacts. Another indication of crackdowns on
interaction with the US, a group of Iranian documentary
filmmakers planning to travel to the US on an IVLP visit was
recently hauled into the Ministry of Culture and advised to turn
down the invitation or face "difficulties."
¶C. (S) WHO DOES IRAN PLAN TO SEND TO THE TALKS? WHAT ROLE, IF
ANY, WILL AHMADI-NEJAD HAVE? RAFSANJANI? LARIJANI? WHO WITHIN
THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL DETERMINE ATTENDANCE AT THE TALKS?
RPO DUBAI 00000036 002.2 OF 003
-- (U) The Iranian government has not publicly confirmed who
will represent Iran in the Baghdad talks. A May 21 Mehr News
article claims the Iranian Foreign Ministry intends to send its
UN PermRep Mohammed-Javed Zarif to lead the talks. Previous
Iranian press pieces had speculated that the current Iranian
Ambassador to Iraq Amir Sa'eed Iravani, Supreme National
Security Council Undersecretary Mohammed Jafari or former
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Kazemi Qomi would head the
delegation.
-- (C) There appears to be division inside the government over
who will be the Iranian interlocutor with the US -- as evidenced
by the delay in the announcement -- which would indicate a power
struggle over what camp gets the "credit." In all likelihood,
the decision will be the Supreme Leader's. The appointment of
Zarif would make sense in terms of his experience in dealing
with the US, but it would be surprising in light of long-term
efforts by Ahmadi-Nejad to sideline him for being too much in
the pragmatic camp. Such a choice would suggest that
Ahmadi-Nejad has little influence on the decision.
-- (S/NF) We heard more from contacts about the issue of who
should represent the US in talks at the ministerial level than
at the ambassadorial level. One conservative contact close to
former FM Velayati claimed the reason that there was no
Secretary Rice-FM Mottaki meeting at Sharm El-Sheikh was because
SIPDIS
it was decided that Mottaki was not the right interlocutor. The
contact called Mottaki weak, in contrast to his predecessors FM
Velayati and Kharrazi who he said were policy advisors as well
as implementers. The source claimed that Ahmadi-Nejad had
chosen Mottaki to be his "puppet."
-- (S/NF) We have heard speculation that Velayati may be
selected to conduct talks, but it is not clear whether that
would only be for talks at the ministerial level or also
ambassadorial. One source recently returned from Iran said
there is discussion of creating a new position for Velayati
within the government, possibly to prepare him to "take over,"
but the source close to Velayati had reportedly told him he was
doubtful that Velayati would agree to join Ahmadi-Nejad's
government. The same source also told IRPO Director that
Velayati plans to run for president in 2009 but will wait to see
the results of the 2008 Majles elections before declaring his
candidacy.
-- (S) One source recently claimed that Supreme National
Security Council Secretary Larijani is in a relatively weak
position within the government (and that one of his brothers --
not clear which one but presumably Mohammad-Javad Larijani --
was more influential than him). Larijani was described as
independent from both the Ahmadi-Nejad group and the Rafsanjani
group.
¶D. (S) WHAT WILL THEIR MARCHING ORDERS BE? WHAT DIRECTIVES
WILL THE PARTICIPANTS BE GIVEN AND WILL THEY HAVE ANY LATITUDE
TO NEGOTIATE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, BESIDES IRAQ ARE
THE PARTICIPANTS PREPARED TO DISCUSS? WHAT PREPARATIONS FOR
FOLLOW-ON TALKS, IF ANY, ARE IRANIAN LEADERS MAKING?
--(U) In the only public comment we have seen indicating
willingness to broaden the agenda, Secretary of the Human Rights
Headquarters of Iran's Judiciary Mohammad-Javad Larijani said on
the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Jordan May 22 that
it is possible that Iranian and US officials could discuss
"issues related to Iran" while in Baghdad. While reiterating to
IRNA that the talks are being held at the request of Iraqi
officials on Iraq only, he did not dismiss the possibility of
broadening the discussions if "Washington shows good will."
¶E. (S) WHAT ARE IRANIAN LEADERS SAYING ABOUT THEIR GOALS AND
CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS US ENGAGEMENT? WHAT ARE THEIR PERCEPTIONS
ABOUT US INTENTIONS FOR THE TALKS? WHY ARE IRANIAN LEADERS
INTERESTED IN HOLDING DIALOGUE NOW?
-- (U) Iranian officials in their public statements are framing
their agreement to attend the talks as a sign of their good will
and intentions towards Iraqis and a sign of US weakness. As
reported by PressTV, Foreign Minister Mottaki told Jordan's King
Abdullah May 20 that Iran "will be seeking the correction of
wrong policies the US has adopted in Iraq when the two countries
sit down."
--(S/NF) Iranians have long asserted that one of the main
obstacles to talks with the US is the issue of who will get
credit for eventual reestablishment of ties. The contact close
to Velayati recently claimed to IRPO Director that President
RPO DUBAI 00000036 003.2 OF 003
Ahmadi-Nejad's status is weakening and that his only chance of
being reelected in 2009 is opening relations with the US. This
source claimed that Ahmadi-Nejad's personal ambition would
triumph over his ideological opposition to dealing with the US.
The same source also claimed Rafsanjani's relative strength has
grown over the past five months. Subsequent to this
conversation, former nuclear negotiator Mousavian was arrested,
and we heard that his arrest made others, including Velayati and
Rafsanjani, very nervous. This would indicate they do not
believe themselves to be untouchable.
Public perceptions
------------
3.(S/NF) At the popular level, prior to the Iraq conference at
Sharm el-Sheikh, we heard there was lots of excitement in Iran
about prospects of Rice-Mottaki meeting, with people handing out
sweets to celebrate. Regarding the Baghdad talks, people seem
to believe both governments' statements that the content will be
restricted to Iraq, but some Iranians say they see these talks
as a first step toward better relations. The source close to
Velayati told IRPO Director that most in the Iranian government
are dying for a green light from US on engagement, motivated in
part by the very bad state of economy. We heard indirectly that
a major Bazaari leader, reportedly close to the Supreme Leader
and an informal advisor to Ahmadi-Nejad, said Iran should have
relations with the US.
4.(C) A negative note about the talks was struck by several
civil society activists, who indicated to IRPoffs concern that
if talks led to political deals between US and Iran, the US
would drop the subject of human rights and democratic reform in
Iran.
5.(C) Comment: Facing growing international pressure and
increased blame by its own population for its economic and
political problems, the government may see in talks on Iraq with
the US a way to deflect domestic and international criticism and
project a more pragmatic image. It may hope that positive
traction in talks will help forestall stepped-up UNSC sanctions
against it. It may also genuinely hope that such talks will
lead to broader engagement. However, the charges against
Esfandiari could indicate an effort by opponents in Iran to
torpedo any kind of engagement with the US. The arrest very
likely indicates Iran will continue its internal crackdown on
civil society and view with suspicion any links with the US --
other than any in which it directly participates.
DAVIS
BURNS
CABLE 2 - May 10, 2007
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/10/2017 TAGS: PREL IR ECON EFIN ETRD SUBJECT: IRANIANS COMPLAIN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MEASURES IMPACTING ORDINARY PEOPLE REF: RPO DUBAI 0030 RPO DUBAI 00000033 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Dubai, UAE. REASON: 1.4 (d) 1.(C) Summary. Iranians are complaining to IRPO that international pressure to isolate Iran is hurting the people more than the government. According to anecdotal information, Iranians reportedly have difficulty opening letters of credit to import goods, including non-sensitive goods not covered by sanctions. One former Iranian official told us that Arabs tell him the US wants to shut down all Arab-Iran trade, including foodstuffs, as well as contact with Iranian society. Iranian businesses, as well as Emirati, are allegedly halting major construction projects in Iran, laying off thousands of employees from companies, and slowing business decisions due to political uncertainty. An Iranian claimed she recently lost her job working for an American company in Dubai after a new "company policy" came out against employing Iranians. An Iranian-American complains he cannot pay his US bills on-line as his US-based bank no longer allows Internet access to accounts from an Iranian internet service provider. While it is not possible to assess the authenticity of all these claims -- and the roots of these problems are doubtless more complex than the causes cited -- the complaints are becoming common enough to document as a factor influencing Iranian public opinion. End Summary. 2.(C) Over the last two months, IRPO contacts have repeatedly claimed that new sanctions and financial restrictions on Iran, as well as increased pressure on countries to stop "business as usual" with Iran, have had a greater negative impact on the Iranian people and "legitimate" business than on the government. (Comment: Reftel details how Iranians also blame their economic problems on domestic policy as well as external pressure. End comment.) A former high level Iranian official claimed Arabs have told him they believe the US is pushing their countries not to have any trade, business, and interaction with Iranian society -- not just with the Iranian government -- and not only asking to stop sales of sophisticated material to Iran, but also "chocolates and dry milk." An Iranian student said his government benefits from this period of political uncertainty as it drives up oil prices, but that ordinary Iranian nationals -- both inside and outside Iran -- are suffering the consequences of new measures against Iran. Letters of credit ------------------ 3.(C) A Dubai-based Iranian financial advisor relayed a second-hand account of a Dubai-based Iranian businessman who had to fly to Taiwan to meet with banking officials after they stopped a letter of credit (LC) he had opened to export toothbrushes from China to Iran. Reportedly, the businessman was eventually able to re-open his LC after spending "unneeded" time and money to clear up the matter. The financial advisor also claimed that on a recent trip to Iran, she noticed that the quality of medicines and basic foodstuffs has declined as Iranian merchants turn to the black market and to "cheap Chinese knockoffs" to secure basic needs. In her opinion, merchants are turning to the black market because it is increasingly difficult to find banks that will support letters of credit, even for legitimate trade. One businessman in Dubai alleged in February that the cost of LCs increased on average by 3-5%. A major Dubai-based tea trader told IRPoff that his company lowered the quality of tea exported to Iran to offset increased operating costs triggered by financial measures on Iran. Stalled projects and lay-offs --------------------------------- 4.(C) Contacts report that the stalled business climate in this period of political uncertainty is triggering higher unemployment. Over the past year, Iranian business owners have told IRPoffs that they have had to lay off large numbers of employees and were holding off on new investment during this period of rising international tensions. A hotel owner complained that foreigner tourists were no longer coming to Iran, only a few foreign businesspeople, and he has had to lay off large numbers of staff. The Iranian-American cited above said an American-educated Iranian friend of hers recently had to sell his house in Iran to buy a car to use as a taxi in order to make ends meet. She also claimed a young US-educated family RPO DUBAI 00000033 002.2 OF 002 friend recently overdosed on heroin after returning to Iran and not finding work. 5.(C) An Iranian-American said her brother-in-law recently had to lay off 2,000 employees in Iran after financing to develop a LNG conversion facility on Kharg Island -- northwest of the port of Bushehr -- "dried up." She said the Iranian government was not able to finance the project. (Note. The contact did not indicate whether the original financing had come from a foreign source. Endnote.) The Iranian-American claimed that according to her relative, the private construction sector in Iran is only operating at 20% capacity and that public companies are only operating at 10% capacity. Separately, an employee of Dubai-based Al-Futtaim Group said that the company recently suspended plans to build several branches of the French hypermarket Carrefour in Iran due to political uncertainty. 6.(C) Expat Iranians also blame USG pressure against Iran for problems they are experiencing. An Iranian contact claimed to IRPoff that US-headquartered Emerson in Dubai terminated the employment of an Iranian friend because a new company policy did not allow it to employ Iranians. (Note: this claim is unconfirmed. Endnote) An Iranian working in Dubai complained that his real estate project in Abu Dhabi was stalled after an American company refused to sell him construction materials because he is Iranian, despite the fact that the final destination for the goods was the UAE. (Comment: The contact appears to come from a reputable company with a long history in the UAE; however, there could, of course, be other reasons that the US company is refraining from doing business with him. End comment) Impacts on Iranian account holders in US banks --------------------------------------------- ------------ 7.(C) Several Iranians have complained that Bank of America reportedly no longer allows electronic bank transfers when account holders access their accounts from an Iran-based internet service provider. An Iranian-American who travels back and forth to Tehran complained that he could not pay his California phone and water bills while in Iran. An Iranian student at a US university told IRPoff that he fears he could default on his credit card bill while home in Iran over the summer since he will not be able to transfer funds from his Bank of America checking account to pay his US credit card. 8.(C) Comment: We stress that these reports are anecdotal; Iranians may also be blaming outside factors for problems of bad luck, poor business practices, and bad macroeconomic policies. Nonetheless, these comments are also an indicator of the kind of "common wisdom" circulating in Iranian business circles and beyond about the impact of US-led financial measures efforts. Most of the complaints appear to center around increasing reluctance from the international community to do business with Iran rather than any concrete measure from UNSCR 1737 and 1747. Iranians also tend to lump all measures together as "sanctions," which would indicate we have more work to do on the public diplomacy front, particularly regarding what actions we are asking of other countries regarding trade with Iran, to offset the notion that we are targeting the Iranian people. President Ahmadi-Nejad will reportedly meet with the Iranian Business Council in Dubai while in the UAE May 13-14; presumably, such business concerns will also be raised with him. End comment. BURNS
CABLE 3 - February 3, 2010
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03 TAGS: PREL CASC PGOV PARM IR SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD FIRESIDE CHAT MENTIONS NUCLEAR ISSUE, US HIKERS CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 2 nationally televised talk that dealt mostly with economic issues, President Ahmadinejad mentioned (almost in passing) that he himself saw no problem with the IAEA proposal for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel, i.e. Iran exporting 3.5 percent enriched uranium in a non-simultaneous transfer, i.e. with 20 percent uranium being delivered later - an exact translation of his comments being "even if we put our 3.5 percent fuel at their disposal, there isn't a problem." Ahmadinejad did note though that the IAEA TRR proposal 'caused a stir' in Iran, and an initial examination of his remarks in context seems to indicate that he was not announcing any IRIG acceptance of the IAEA TRR deal, but instead speaking hypothetically on the consequences of accepting the IAEA TRR deal. Such an interpretation accords with the fact that with the expiration of the IRIG 'deadline' for the West to accept its TRR nuclear offer, last night he repeated his January 24 assertion that he intends to announce 'good news' on the nuclear front next week (his exact January 24 statement being: "during the 'Ten Days of Fajr' I will announce good news concerning producing 20 percent nuclear fuel"). Separately, Ahmadinejad said that discussions were taking place that could lead to an exchange of the three detained US hikers in exchange for Iranian citizens being held in the US for export violations. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On February 2 President Ahmadinejad gave a live night-time nationally televised talk to the nation. Self-congratulatory if not triumphalist in tone, most of it dealt with seeking to assuage popular concerns over his administration's implementation of the controversial Targeted Subsidies Bill recently enacted into law. However, the two relatively small sections of his speech that caught the attention of the Western press dealt with nuclear issues and with the issue of the three imprisoned US hikers. A rough translation of President Ahmadinejad's comments on these two issues follows. [NOTE: The Persian text of his comments was taken from his official website; other coverage of his speech seems to have only minor variations. IRPO comments in hard brackets]. ¶3. (SBU): AHMADINEJAD ON NUCLEAR ISSUES ...In nuclear matters, they sanctioned us and didn't give us any parts, but now what is the state of our nuclear condition? Good news in that regard will be announced next week. ...Comparing four years ago to now shows where we've reached in our nuclear situation. Four years ago we'd opened the Esfahan nuclear plant...our enemies didn't accept this, making a big fuss and issuing resolutions. ...For three and a half years they were saying that Iran must not have the fuel cycle; then they said come let's negotiate, then they said suspend for three months and then resume, and with the passage of time they backed down. ...Now you can see where we've arrived. We are enriching uranium and even have the capability to produce 20 percent enriched fuel. They all know this; the talk is now over us coming and cooperating and exchanging [i.e. Iran's LEU for 20 percent fuel]. ...Some have accepted the proposals of interaction and [fuel] exchange and some, including the British and the Zionist regime, were uncomfortable with this suggestion. They said: if the matter becomes one of interacting [with Iran], it's all over, i.e. they thought if Iran engages in nuclear cooperation with the main countries producing nuclear fuel, what would the Zionists do! And they were very angry with this suggestion [of interaction with Iran]. Some also unconsciously sided with them. DUBAI 00000029 002 OF 003 ..In our opinion there is no problem with exchange [i.e. fuel exchange] but some of them [foreign parties] have behaved incorrectly, which has caused negotiations and exchanges to fall behind. Some were saying that if we bring 20 percent fuel to Iran, Iran will build an atomic bomb and I answered them saying that we are brave enough such that if we want to build an atomic bomb we'll say it: we're not like you who seek to conceal your goals. We explicitly say that we are opposed to you. ...They [foreign parties? the enemy?] know that we are very advanced but they propagandize, to which we respond that if you honestly come forward we will cooperate with you. Lately they've sent messages and some of their concerns were right; because if a factory wants to produce 20 percent fuel it must change its production line and stop its production. ...Our colleagues proposed that there be an exchange of 3.5 percent fuel for 20 percent fuel carried out in three stages and the opinion of the foreign parties was that this was not possible from a technical viewpoint, and this was true. The foreign parties even suggested that the 3.5 percent fuel stay in Iran, we [i.e. the foreign parties] will sign a contract, we'll produce 20 percent fuel and then later do an exchange with you [i.e. with Iran]. [ NOTE: The following part of his speech seems to be the genesis of Western press stories about Iran accepting the IAEA TRR deal:] Even if we put our 3.5 percent fuel at their disposal [i.e. ship it out before getting a simultaneous exchange of 20 percent fuel] there isn't a problem. Of course some inside Iran raised a fuss and said they [foreign parties] will take our fuel and not give any back. We replied that if they don't give it [20 percent fuel] to us, what happens, whose words will be proved correct? If they [i.e. the foreign parties] don't act according to their obligations it will be proven that they can't be trusted and the hands of the IAEA and those who signed the contract will be exposed and our hands will be free to do our own work [i.e. presumably to continue enrichment themselves]. If they don't interact with us [i.e. don't live up to their word] the international environment will change in our favor. Therefore, they want to cooperate with us, and other than those two countries I mentioned [Israel & UK], we have no problems. From the beginning we had no fight to pick; it was they who picked a fight. Nuclear fuel is our right; at first they made a fuss, but now they want to cooperate with us. They can come and build 20 nuclear power stations for us; Russia, France and the US can come and sign contracts and build power plants: it is both in our interest and in their interest. Of course if they don't come eventually we ourselves will reach the point where we build [nuclear] power stations: our nation will not stop. We need 20,000 megawatts of nuclear-generated electricity; if they cooperate they will profit and we will reach our goals and if they don't cooperate our nation will not wait for them and will meet our own needs. We are prepared to cooperate with any nation other than the UK and the Zionist regime on the nuclear issue provided that our nation's strategic interests are met. On the nuclear issue... they came and caused problems and for four to five years we had serious issues...but the Iranian nation stood firm. Now we have passed that phase and the matter is basically settled and now the issue is one of cooperation and we will cooperate within the framework of the Iranian nation's interests and there is no problem. All of these packages of proposals took form due to the nuclear pretext; when the nuclear issue goes away the subject of dialogue changes and slowly the path opens for broader cooperation on DUBAI 00000029 003 OF 003 various issues. ¶4. (SBU) AHMADINEJAD ON US HIKERS: Those Americans who were detained violated [the law] and entered our country illegally. Later, it became clear in reports that they knowingly entered our borders and knew what they were doing. I said I'd help and talked with the Judicial Branch but the behavior of some American officials ruined this [i.e. my initiative]. There are a large number of Iranians in prison and they have kidnapped some of our citizens from other countries and taken them and by pressuring other governments have arrested a great number of our citizens and convicted them in America. This is very bad and it limits what we can do, both us and the Judicial branch. But there are discussions [taking place] can lead to an exchange. We don't want to have people in prisons. They violated the law and [illegally] crossed our borders, their crime is clear but those Iranians who are in US prisons haven't done any apparent crime, i.e. they are not guilty, or at least it hasn't been announced to us and they have been several years in prison without a court and trial. The Americans have taken Iranian citizens for no reasons and said to them that they [the detained Iranians] wanted to export goods to Iran but there are no documents or proof for their acts [and in any case] is it a crime to export goods? ¶5. (C) COMMENT: Contrary to some Western press stories, it doesn't seem [to IRPO at least] that President Ahmadinejad sought to stake out any new position with his nuclear comments last night. Such an interpretation accords with the fact that with the expiration of the IRIG 'deadline' for the West to accept its TRR nuclear offer, he repeated his assertion last night that he still intends to announce 'good news' on the nuclear front next week, the presumption being that such news will relate to enriching to 20 percent (NOTE: On January 24, President Ahmadinejad told reporters that "during the 'Ten Days of Fajr' I will announce good news concerning producing 20 percent nuclear fuel"). Indeed, Ahmadinejad's comments last night seem to reflect what we already know: while he himself supported the IAEA TRR deal, other powerful factions within Iran opposed it. One well-placed IRPO contact with connections to Iran's nuclear industry said he had heard from a knowledgeable source that the main reason Iran rejected the IAEA TRR deal was due to the resistance of key IRGC leadership to the idea of exporting the lion's share of Iran's enriched uranium abroad, since it saw this uranium as an important component of its strategic power. Regardless of the veracity of such a claim, it seems unlikely from President Ahmadinejad's remarks that Iran has changed its official position on the TRR deal. END COMMENT. EYRE
